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Diaspora Identity and a New Generation: 
Armenian Diaspora Youth on the Genocide and the Karabakh War 
  
Abstract 
In this paper, we explore the role of the early 20th century Armenian genocide and the 
unresolved Karabakh conflict of the 1990s in identity among the new generation of Armenian 
diaspora ± those who grew up after the establishment of the independent Armenian state in 
1991. We draw on original interviews with diasporic youth in France, the United Kingdom and 
Russia ± diasporas which were largely built in the aftermath of the genocide and the Karabakh 
war. Diaspora youth relate to these events through transmitted collective memories, but also 
UHFRQQHFWZLWKWKHGLVWDQWKRPHODQG¶VSDVWDQGSUHVHQWLQnew ways as they engage with new 
possibilities of transnational digital communication and mobility. Their experiences of identity 
shed light on how the new generation of diasporic Armenians defines itself in relation to the 
past; how this past is (re)made present in their interpretations of the Karabakh conflict and in 
everyday behaviors; and how diasporic youth exSHULHQFHWKHGLOHPPDVRIµPRYLQJRQ¶from 
traumatic narratives that for a long time have been seen as foundational to their identity. 
Keywords: diaspora, Armenia, Karabakh, identity, generation, social media 
  
Introduction 
The change of generations, particularly for diasporas, is frequently seen as both a threat and an 
opportunity. Expectations of moving forward on a path of healing and reconciliation in long-
term conflicts, liberalization of cultural values, and the hopes of a future return are closely 
intHUWZLQHGZLWKIHDUVRI\RXQJSHRSOH¶VGLVUHVSHFWIRUWKHSDVWORVVRIFXOWXUDOKHULWDJHDQG
memory, further distancing from homeland, and the blurring of identity. Diasporic 
communities, often founded on shared narratives of traumatic historical experiences, are 
therefore engaged in a paradoxical relationship with change: their past determines the present, 
but their future largely depends on how the new generations engage with both. This poses the 
TXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUQHZJHQHUDWLRQVRIGLDVSRUDVFDQ³move on´± re-narrate in new ways, de-
prioritize or altogether change traumatic narratives that for a long time have been seen as 
foundational to diasporic identity ± without losing their sense of unity. 
In this paper, we explore the accounts of the new generation of the Armenian diaspora, whose 
experience of the past is distinct from older generations in three ways. First, they have grown 
up in the presence of a nation-state which could be considered homeland1, as the Republic of 
Armenia gained independence in 1991 and subsequently won the war against Azerbaijan, 
effectively securing control over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Second, this 
generation is mostly too young to remember this war or witnessed it from a distance, and 
therefore must rely on trans-generational transmission of memories and mediated 
representations to make sense of it. Finally, the new generation can engage in new ways of 
UHODWLQJWR WKHKRPHODQG¶VSDVWDQGSUHVHQW LQFOXGLQJGLJLWDOPHGLDDQGPXOWLSOHVSRQVRUHG
opportunities for the diaspora youth to visit the independent Armenian state. 
The focus of this article is on the role of two major historical events in the identity of Armenian 
diaspora youth in these dynamic contexts: the Armenian genocide of 19152 which is widely 
seen as the defining moment for the Armenian diasporas (particularly in the West), and the 
currently unresolved Karabakh conflict3, the regular escalations of which stimulate diasporic 
youth to (re)define their relationship with the homeland and their sense of identity. Drawing 
RQ WKH WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUNV RI ³SRVWPHPRU\´ +LUVFK 12 DQG ³SDVW SUHVHQFLQJ´
(Macdonald 2013), we explore how the new generation negotiates their identity in relation to  
these critical events. We reveal the dilemmas that the diasporic youth are experiencing, 
particularly how their increasing desire WR³PRYHRQ´from the traumatic past and re-define 
diasporic Armenian-ness is held back by the often-implicit presence and weight of this past. 
This dilemma is deepened by the fact that young diasporic Armenians are negotiating their 
identity in an increasingly digital world, which offers new ways of re-connecting with the 
homeland and with diaspora members. The internet provides space for diasporic mobilization 
as it brings the distant homeland close and aids activism for genocide recognition; but presents 
space for contestation too, as it leads the diasporic youth to engage with the Karabakh conflict 
in a new and ambivalent way and facilitates alternative narratives of identity. 
  
Diaspora identity, past traumas and generational change 
The last decades have seen a gradual turn towards constructivist explanations of diaspora 
LGHQWLW\DV³LPDJLQHGWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLWLHV´5HGFOLIW 2017, 504). This turn follows the 
EURDGHUVFKRODUVKLSRQ³LPDJLQHGFRPPXQLWLHV´ $QGHUVRQDQG WKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
QDWLRQDO HWKQLF DQG RWKHU ³ODUJH JURXSV´ DV FRQVWUXFWHG ± in other words, held together, 
experienced and performed through selectively chosen narratives and constantly (re)negotiated 
referents of identity that distinguish group membership against otherness (Volkan 1988). 
Diasporas are dispersed communities that share space with a host society but are 
simultaneously oriented towards a distant homeland (Brubaker 2005), and this makes elements 
that constitute diaspora identity and its boundary particularly important. Diasporic belonging 
involves continuous construction of identity in both space and time, as its members constantly 
negotiate belonging with homeland and host states (Cavoukian 2013; Tölölyan 2007) and relate 
to the diasporic community at large and to the distant homeland through imagining (Axel 2002; 
Walle 2013; Tsagarousianou 2004). 
Diasporic identity can therefore be described as a fluid rather than fixed self-understanding 
which is constructed, reproduced, and transmitted across generations and spaces (Abramson 
2017). As a process rather than a bounded entity, diasporas unite around collective and 
(re)negotiated narratives of sameness and the homeland (Mavroudi 2007). Mavroudi puts 
forward the notion of diaspora as a flexible process in which displaced people negotiate visions 
of community and homeland that, for political and cultural reasons, are represented as 
foundational to diasporic identity. Shared historical memories, cultural mediums, and symbols 
are central to this process as ³GLIIHUHQWSHUVRQVPXVWEHDEOHWRQRXULVKWKHLULPDJLQDWLRQIURP
WKH VDPH VRXUFH´ %ROWDQVNL   'LDVSRULF LGHQWLW\ LV ³DOZays constructed through 
PHPRU\ IDQWDV\ QDUUDWLYH DQG P\WK´ (Hall 1990, 226), as its coherent and continuous 
biography is rooted in narratives that establish the spatio-temporal parameters of the 
FRPPXQLW\¶V H[LVWHQFH %HUHQVNRHWWHU. Historical narratives and collective memories 
underlie diasporic notions of loss or the regaining of homeland, return, and more generally, 
belonging. Diasporas become seen as (re)created through shared imagination and collective 
memory (Alexander 2013; Ziemer 2010), including through the revival of shared historical 
experience in imagining their homeland (Wilcock 2018). 
Collective memory, however, is distinct from the understanding of history as a more accurate, 
albeit elite-produced, factology of the past (see Macdonald 2013). Since the introduction of 
FROOHFWLYHPHPRU\DVDFRQFHSWE\+DOEZDFKVWRGHQRWHSHRSOH¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK
historical events as if they were personal experiences and the role of social groups in creating 
solidarity through remembering, the selective and subjective aspects of collective memory have 
EHHQHPSKDVL]HG9RONDQVXJJHVWVWKDWFROOHFWLYHPHPRULHVFRQVLVWRI³FKRVHQJORULHV´
DQG³FKRVHQWUDXPDV´- shared, selected, and subjective representations of historical events and 
ILJXUHVZKLFKPDLQWDLQ WKHFRPPXQLW\¶VVHQVHRIVHOI7KH\EHFRPHFHQWUDO WR WKHJURXS¶V
identity and unite its members through feelings of pride, humiliation or mourning. The 
interpretation and remembering of subsequent events involve relating them to these collectively 
shared referents from the past. Collective memories therefore help communities unite through 
DQ³LPSUHFLVHSURFHVVRILPDJLQDWLRQ´&DPSEHOO 
For diasporas, the past is widely seen as defining their present as many of them trace their 
dispersion and sense of collective identity to traumatic events and narratives of loss. For the 
Armenian diaspora, the genocide of 1915 is widely recognised as the defining and foundational 
narrative (Kasbarian 2018; Laycock 2016) that explains its coming into being, as well as its 
WUDMHFWRU\ LQ WLPHDQGVSDFH$QG \HW UHPHPEUDQFHRI WKH³FKRVHQ WUDXPD´ LVDSDVWRIDQ
³DKLVWRULFDONLQG´5HGFOLIWDV LWEHFRPHVUHZRUNHGIRU WKHSUHVHQWDQGFDQJDLQQHZ
meanings (Soysal 2000). Macdonald (20DSWO\GHVFULEHVWKLVDV³past presencing´RUKRZ
the past is present or is made present through experience, representation, performance and 
LPDJLQLQJ ³3DVW SUHVHQFLQJ´ VXJJHVWV WKDW LGHQWLWLHV DUH URRWHG QRW VLPSO\ LQ VKDULQJ D
connection to a common history and remembering past events, but in the continuous and even 
implicit re-purposing and re-making of their meaning in the present. In the case of the 
$UPHQLDQGLDVSRUDDQGLWVUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWUDXPDWLFPHPRULHVRIWKHSDVW³SDVWSUHVHQFLQJ´
can be observed in the modern-day mentality of victimhood (Ziemer 2010) and survival against 
ever-present threats (Laycock 2016; Panossian 2002), which, as we shall demonstrate, 
permeates diasporic conceptions of identity, evaluation of subsequent events, and everyday 
behaviours.  
³3DVWSUHVHQFLQJ´FDQDOVREHREVHUYHGLQGLDVSRUDFRQVROLGDWLRQLQDKRVWVWDWHDVZHOODVLQ
its mobilization towards the homeland. Mavroudi (2018) defines diaspora mobilization as 
helping the homeland in material ways (for example, through activism or acts of charity); 
however, multiple layers of diaspora identity and mobilization need to be recognised (Redclift 
2017). Diaspora mobilization is often connected to narratives of (in)security and crises in the 
homeland; although not all such crises automatically lead to diaspora mobilization, which is 
often hampered by uncertainty over how to mobilize and issues of trust and corruption in the 
homeland (Koinova 2018; Mavroudi 2018). Pattie (1999) suggests that the memory of the 
genocide continues to create a sense of responsibility to the Armenian community and therefore 
unite it through shared experience of loss made meaningful in the present. Besides being bound 
by shared historical experience, Wilcock (2018, 373) also interprets the impact of the past on 
GLDVSRUDV¶SUHVHQWDVDVHQVHRIGXW\DULVLQJIURPWKH³QHHGWRDWRQHIRUOHDYLQJ´ 
Collective memory, as well as past presencing, largely depend on trans-generational 
transmission, or passing on of memories and their meaning from one generation to the next. 
This way, trauma and loss can become a source of identity even for those who did not directly 
H[SHULHQFHLW/D&DSUDDVWKH\FDQIRUP³LQGLUHFWNQRZOHGJH´RISDVWHYHQWV+RIIPDQ
2004). Hirsch describes the result of this transmission as postmemory ± experiences transmitted 
WRWKH³³JHQHUDWLRQDIWHU´«E\PHDQVRIWKHVWRULHVLPDJHVDQGEHKDYLRUVDPRQJZKLFKWKH\
JUHZXS«VRGHHSO\DQGDIIHFWLYHO\DV WR VHHP WRFRQVWLWXWHPHPRULHV LQ WKHLURZQULJKW´
(Hirsch 2012, 5). Postmemory achieves the integration of collective memories with personal 
family histories, as traumatic events that become further distant in time are relived at both the 
communal and individual/family level. Both Hirsch (2012) and Laycock (2016), however, 
caution that new generations risk becoming overwhelmed and dominated by inherited 
memories, with limited capacity to produce their own identity story. 
,QGHHG QHZ JHQHUDWLRQV KLJKOLJKW GLDVSRUDV¶ XQHDV\ UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK FKDQJH 7UDQV-
generational transmission is largely focused on keeping the past present, so that foundational 
narratives of identity, such as chosen traumas and narratives of loss, continue to unite and 
mobilize the diasporic community. Diaspora organizations, homeland governments, and 
parents often seek to maintain these foundational narratives as the way to transmit and maintain 
diasporic identity for the next generations and cultivate attachments to homeland (see 
Abramson 2017; Darieva 2018; Mahieu 2015). Yet, this task is complicated by other factors, 
such as the dynamic relationships between diasporas and homeland, diasporas and host states, 
and the changing mediums through which they relate. These changing environments contribute 
to concerns about the new generations failing to form postmemory and becoming disconnected 
from the memories and cultural roots that are central to diaspora identity. For example, Pattie 
(1999, 85) documented concern among the older generation of the Armenian diaspora about 
WKH ³ORVV´ RI GLDVSRULF \RXWK WR ³GLIIHUHQW FXOWXUDO ZRUOGV´ whereby the youth becomes 
selective, future-oriented, and lacking ³FXOWXUDO KHLUV´ LQ WKH FRPPXQLW\ .DVEDULDQ 
similarly came across anxiety among Armenian diaspora leaders about the weakening role of 
the genocide as defining diasporic identity, particularly for younger generations. Brinkerhoff 
(2012) observed that by moving beyond physical communities and structures into digital 
spaces, diasporic youth may more freely debate, challenge and re-negotiate key identity 
narratives., and as a result develop new ties rather than nourish old ones (also see Hiller and 
Franz 2004). 
And yet, as Maier (1993) notes, communities need both to remember and to forget, otherwise 
they can become preoccupied with narratives of loss ± the stage when the political life of a 
community is focused on sacralizing memory and pursing public recognition for its sufferings. 
The latter is particularly problematic, as the community risks becoming synonymous with 
victimhood in the eyes of others. Perception of subsequent events and interactions becomes 
confined to the experience of loss, even if this creates long-term problems. While mobilizing 
the community around shared trauma, preoccupation with loss can prevent it from moving on, 
not just politically, but in everyday self-definitions. To enable transformation, identity needs 
to be reoriented back to the future (Muldoon 2017). 
In this study, we focus on questions of how the past is made present, and how the new 
generation4 of the Armenian diaspora reconcile the postmemory of events they did not witness 
ZLWKWKHGHVLUHWR³PRYHRQ´IURPWKHWUDXPDVRIWKHSDVW$VSHFWVRIFKDQJHFDQDOUHDG\EH
observed in how young women in the Armenian diaspora challenge conservative cultural 
values (Ziemer 2010) and how other, non-Armenian diasporas become engaged in parallel, as 
opposed to shared, remembering and future-making (Wilcock 2018). These questions can shed 
QHZOLJKWRQGLDVSRUDV¶FDSDFLW\IRUFKDQJHDQGWKHUROHRIQHZJHQHUDWLRQVDQGPHPRU\LQ
the process. 
  
Method 
We draw on original semi-structured interviews with 26 Armenians, conducted in France, the 
United Kingdom and Russia. The genocide is the central historical event in the formation of 
Armenian diasporas in Europe. The Armenian community in France is the largest in the EU 
(Zenian 1995), and the UK community, although smaller, grew rapidly with the intra-European 
displacement of Armenians fleeing World War II.  Our participants in France and the UK are 
mainly second-generation and beyond (with most families uprooted by the genocide and some 
by the Karabakh war). Meanwhile, Russia has the largest population of ethnic Armenians 
outside Armenia. ASSO\LQJWKHWHUP³GLDVSRUD´WR5XVVLD¶V$UPHQLDQFRPPXQLW\DWODUJHLV
problematic: many are temporary economic migrants and Armenians were not considered a 
diaspora or external migrants during Soviet times (Cavoukian 2013). Our interviewees in 
Moscow include young Armenians born in Russia or brought into the country shortly after 
birth, in the wake of the Karabakh war. Their families are settled permanently in Russia and 
are not temporary labour migrants. 
Our participants come from a range of ages between 18-35 (most are in their 20s), representing 
the generation who have grown up after the independence of Armenia and are too young to 
remember the Karabakh war. Gender balance was maintained throughout the sample; however, 
our primary purpose was not to seek a representative sample across potential variables, but to 
engage with particular experiences of Armenians from the post-independence generation and 
identify shared patterns of experience through thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). The 
interviews were conducted between March and July 2017, and participants were recruited 
through a snowball approach which enabled us to collect data from within organic social 
networks (Noy 2008). Participants were directly interviewed in French, English or Russian, 
and the interview fragments quoted in our analysis are translated into English where necessary. 
To protect their anonymity, the names of all participants have been changed. 
  
*HQRFLGHYLFWLPKRRGDQG³PRYLQJRQ´ 
The genocide of 1915 and the following years played a key role in the emergence of the 
Armenian diaspora, but is still not recognised by Turkey or most other countries. Genocide 
denial serves as a constant reminder of past collective trauma: as Ziemer QRWHV ³EHLQJ
Armenian thereafter also meant being a survivor of the genocide and a member of a community 
RIVXIIHUHUVZKRVHVXIIHULQJFRQWLQXHVWREHGHQLHGE\WKHSHUSHWUDWRUVDQGWKHLUDOOLHV´
 $V WKH ³ILQDO VWDJH RI JHQRFLGH´ .DVEDULDQ 018), denial gives the event the new 
meaning of a loss, the mourning of which is not yet complete. Memories of these events, 
followed by the ongoing controversies of recognitions and denials of the genocide by other 
countries5, are transmitted through generations and continue to play a crucial role in the 
construction of Armenian identity: 
The genocide is a special topic, all our history is split into before and after. Diaspora 
appeared after the genocide. (Arsen, 28, Russia) 
The unifying impact of the genocide through family histories, attachment to the homeland, and 
the desire for international recognition was felt strongly among the interviewees in Russia, 
)UDQFHDQGWKH8.$VDQRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWSXWLW³LWLVGLIILFXOWQRWWRIHHO$UPHQLDQEHFDXVH
all WKHVH HYHQWV GLUHFWO\ VKDSHG \RXU RZQ ELRJUDSK\´ 9LJHQ 28, Russia). Rouzane from 
France further emphasizes that the legacy of the genocide has differentiated Armenian identity 
from simply national, religious or ethnic unity and given it special significance: 
[The genocide] is a common destiny because every Armenian family was affected by 
the massacres, in some way or another. For the existence of the community, this is an 
LPSRUWDQWXQLI\LQJWUDLWEXW«PDQ\SHRSOHRXWWKHUHVKRFNPHE\VD\LQJWKDWLIZH
hDGQ¶WKDGWKHJHQRFLGHWKHUHZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQVXFKXQLW\$QGWKLVLVWKHTXHVWLRQ
I think the Jews have the same question, is unity only the result of trauma? This 
WUDXPDWLF XQLW\ LV QRW WKH VDPH DV MXVW QDWLRQDOXQLW\ LW LV« VSHFLDO 5RX]DQH 31, 
France) 
The ongoing controversies about genocide recognition further contributed to how young 
diaspora Armenians saw the Armenian state and the diaspora. Armenia was portrayed in the 
interviews as a small nation surrounded by hostile powers and genocide recognition ± as a 
bargaining chip in the global power politics. As René from France describes, 
[This is] a political game around genocide recognition, because foreign countries could 
IRUFHDVN7XUNH\WRUHFRJQLVHWKHJHQRFLGH«7KHUH¶VHYLGHQFHSKRWRVEXW«,QWKH
USA, 46 states have recognised Armenian genocide, but the US President refuses to 
QDPHLWDJHQRFLGHEHFDXVHE\GRLQJVRKHZRXOGDQJHU7XUNH\«DQGWKHUH¶V1$72
$QG WKH $PHULFDQV ZDQW WR NHHS XVLQJ WKH >DLU@ EDVH LQ ,QFLUOLN« ,VUDHO ZDQWV WR
maintain relations with Turkey to keep selling them weapons. Israelis themselves have 
VXUYLYHGDJHQRFLGH«WKH\VWLOOKDYHWRILJKW6\ULDDQG(J\SWWRFRQWLQXHWRH[LVW%XW
WKH\GHFLGHGQRWWRUHFRJQLVH>WKH$UPHQLDQJHQRFLGH@«7XUNH\LVDJRRGFOLHQWRI
Israel, and Israel would not lose a good client. (René, 33, France) 
For René, and for many other participants, genocide denial is not determined by lack of 
evidence, but by external political interests. Genocide recognition was seen by some as a cause 
to be actively supported by the community as a whole, and not only the state, due to the 
existential significance of the genocide for the diaspora, and the view that the state alone could 
not achieve recognition. A number of participants felt strongly about the need for recognition 
and were aware of or took part in various recognition campaigns. Therefore, while creating a 
disempowered vision of the Armenian state, the issue of genocide recognition mobilizes and 
empowers young people today in the diaspora community through what they see as a collective 
struggle for social and political justice, and not only the experience of loss. 
However, it is problematic to limit Armenian diaspora identity to shared memories of past 
violence or to assume that these memories serve as equally powerful and unquestioned 
referents of identity for all members of the diaspora community. We suggest that the 
interrelationship between memories of the genocide and diaspora identity could be more multi-
layered and complex. The young Armenians we interviewed clearly knew and revered the past 
but expressed different attitudes to how the genocide should be remembered and spoken about 
and disagreed on the role it should play in the life and identity of the diaspora and its future 
generations. These attitudes ranged from actively campaigning for international genocide 
recognition and defining identity through the history of loss to suggestions that victimhood 
should not be the source of identity as it confines Armenian-ness to the single unattractive 
JOREDOLPDJHRI³WKRVHSRRUSHRSOHZKRKDGEHHQPDVVDFUHG´5RX]DQH31, France). Instead, 
Armenian culture, knowledge of the Armenian language, oU SHUVRQDO TXDOLWLHV µ$UPHQLDQ
ZDUPWK¶KRVSLWDOLW\QDWLRQDOSULGHZHUHPRVWIUHTXHQWO\VXJJHVWHGDVNH\DOWHUQDWLYHLGHQWLW\
markers. Even within history, alternative, non-traumatic events could be found: as René noted, 
They talk a lot about the Armenia of the 20th century, with the genocide, the USSR and 
the war against Azerbaijan, which is still unresolved today. But Armenians are also a 
people with a 3000-year old history. (René, 33, France) 
Armenian youth from all three locations expressed criticism about how the genocide is 
typically seen as identity-IRXQGLQJ DQG VXJJHVWHG LW ZDV WLPH WR ³PRYH RQ´ DQG GHILQH
Armenian identity differently. For younger diaspora Armenians in particular, genocide 
remembrance is growing increasingly performative ± responding to a certain obligation from 
older members of their community to take part in traditional commemoration activities, which 
³ZLOO QRW FKDQJH DQ\WKLQJ´ 6RPH OLNH $OLFH LQ )UDQFH UHFDOO UHVLVWLQJ WKH VWHUHRW\SLFDO
perception of Armenians and feeling the need for alternative unifying narratives: 
I feel that too often, when they talk about Armenians, they talk about the genocide. We 
QHHGWRWDONDERXWLWDVLW¶VSDUWRIRXUKLVWRU\«%XWDKXQGUHG\HDUVKDYHpassed, and 
I feel that there are new generations for whom there has been enough talk about the 
JHQRFLGH,KDGWKLVIHHOLQJVLQFH,ZDVVPDOODQGWKHUHZDVDWLPHZKHQ,GLGQ¶WZDQW
WRWDONDERXW$UPHQLD«WREHEUDQGHGµ$UPHQLDQ¶µJHQRFLGH¶µ$UPHQLDQGDQFH¶«
This was my Armenian rebellion. But today I really think that the youth, particularly in 
France, with whom I communicate regularly, need to define themselves differently 
(Alice, 34, France) 
$OLFH¶V YLVLRQ RI WKH QHHG IRU D UHGHILQHG UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ $UPHQLDQ LGHQWLW\ DQG WKH
genocide was closely echoed by Anahid: 
,KRSHDORWRISHRSOHZLOOUHFRJQL]HWKHJHQRFLGHEXWLW¶VYHU\LPSRUWDQWDOVRWRPRYH
forward, I think a lot of people are stuck in the past and that is a shame because when 
\RXDUHVWXFNLQWKHSDVW\RXFDQQRWSURJUHVV«:HNQRZWKDWLWKDSSHQHGZHGRQ¶W
QHHGWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWZRKXQGUHGFRXQWULHVWRVD\WKDWKDVKDSSHQHG«WRGD\LVWKH
moment to move forward, to think about the future, to invest in the future of our 
children. (Anahid, 21, France) 
For interviewees with children, WKH GLOHPPD RI µPRYLQJ RQ¶ meant not just redefining 
themselves, but the challenge of passing cultural identity on to the next generation without 
passing on the pain: 
I feel I am Armenian in culture and French by citizenship and today I have a small 
VRQ«and for me the problem is how to explain it to my son that with such diverse 
KHULWDJH WKHUH LV KLVWRU\ ZKLFK LV SDLQIXO XQUHVROYHG« 3DUWLFXODUO\ WKH JHQRFLGH
UHFRJQLWLRQ$QGWKLVLVWKHEXUGHQ,WKLQNWKDWWKHIXWXUHJHQHUDWLRQVZLOODOVRFDUU\«
And I really want to pass the culture to my son. I try to speak Armenian to him, and my 
parents speak Armenian to him too, this needs to happen naturally. And then the 
TXHVWLRQLVKRZFDQWKLVDOOKDSSHQZLWKRXWSDVVLQJRQWKHSDLQDOVRDQGWKHUH¶VORWVRI
it LQWKHFRPPXQLW\«.DULQp31, France) 
The young people we interviewed were usually FDXWLRXVLQH[SUHVVLQJWKHLGHDRI³PRYLQJRQ´ 
and included UHVHUYDWLRQVWKDWSHRSOHQHHGWR³WDONDERXW´DQG³UHFRJQL]H´WKHJHQRFLGH7KHUH
was no uniform agreement on this among their peers, let alone older generations in their 
IDPLOLHV +RZHYHU VXJJHVWLRQV DERXW ³PRYLQJ RQ´ from the identity-defining role of the 
genocide or reluctance to pass on the painful aspects of their history to their own children 
emerged at least in passing in a considerable number of interviews, and were understood by 
several participants as representing a changing attitude in the diaspora to the role of the 
genocide in Armenian identity. As the genocide becomes more distant and less personal for 
new generations, its role as an identity-founding narrative may be tested. The consequences of 
the genocide, however, have already become an inherent part in the evaluation of other, more 
UHFHQWHYHQWVLQ$UPHQLD¶VKLVWRU\DQGGLDVSRULFEHKDYLRUVLQthe present. The genocide may 
therefore have a further-UHDFKLQJODVWLQJXQGHUO\LQJLPSDFWRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQVRI$UPHQLD¶V
present, as well as its future. 
  
The Karabakh conflict and diasporic identity 
Memories of the genocide are closely intertwined with those of the more recent Karabakh war 
of the 1990s between Armenia and Azerbaijan and subsequent escalations of violence on the 
frontline (notably including the Four Day war between April 1-5, 2016). Karabakh remains 
effectively under Armenian control (it is a self-proclaimed independent state, unrecognized by 
the international community), and each side periodically accuses the other of violating the 
ceasefire, keeping the crisis permanently on the regional political agenda. Three points of 
connection between the genocide and the Karabakh conflict strongly emerge from the 
interviews. First, the genocide and the Karabakh war share the same symbolic adversary: many 
RI RXU LQWHUYLHZHHV UHJDUGHG $]HULV DV 7XUNV DQG $]HUEDLMDQ DV 7XUNH\¶V VDWHOOLWH VWDWH
directly blaming Turkey for the conflict and connecting the enemy in the Karabakh war to the 
genocide perpetrator. Azerbaijan and Turkey have close cultural and linguistic ties, and Turkey 
has supported Azerbaijan in the Karabakh dispute and at times made demands on the status of 
Karabakh in negotiations to normalise relations with Armenia, leading Armenians to view this 
as the continuation of its anti-Armenian policies. Second, both events remain unresolved, with 
the ongoing struggle for the international recognition of the genocide and the volatility of the 
ceasefire in Karabakh. History ± and unresolved history in particular, in which conflict, family 
history of emigration, and loss of homeland are bound together ± becomes an important element 
of Armenian diaspora identity. Third, some of the interviewees explained specific attachment 
to Karabakh and the need to protect the Armenian victory there as a symbolic fight for survival 
and historical justice, which has been denied for too long. They noted that the importance of 
Karabakh to Armenians is directly connected to the genocide and represents a preoccupation 
with the loss of human life, land, and culture associated with the nation: 
Armenians have lost so much land, and so many people, and Karabakh brings that back. 
$UPHQLDQVIHHO WKDW WKH\DUHULJKW LQ WKLVDQG, IHHO WKDW WRR6R LW LV LPSRUWDQW LW¶V
about justice (Arman, 23, UK) 
And yet, despite the temporal proximity of the war and the unresolved status of Karabakh, for 
many in the diaspora youth, the conflict seemed more distant and less significant as a unifying 
factor, compared to the genocide. It had less personal influence for many, and the interviewees 
who felt particularly strongly about the conflict were the ones who still had relatives in Armenia 
and Karabakh or knew friends who had gone to fight as volunteers. British and French 
Armenians in particular also noted that major western media devoted little attention to the 
region, making it difficult to access news about the conflict6. Karabakh became a distant, 
invisible war with a clear past but uncertain present. The four-day escalation of April 2016 
revived conversations about Karabakh, particularly online discussions among younger 
Armenians, some of whom considered possible ways to help their homeland at this time and 
mobilize as a community or knew others who thought of leaving for Armenia to support the 
military. But when speaking about the conflict and its unresolved status more generally, most 
were relatively dispassionate and conveyed uncertainty about what should be done. 
While clearly accusing Azerbaijan and Turkey for starting the war, some of the participants 
EODPHGWKHXQUHVROYHGVWDWXVRIWKHFRQIOLFWRQ$UPHQLD¶VRZQVWDWHSROLFLHV,QGRLQJVRWKH\
drew a distinction between the courage and historical victimhood of the Armenian people and 
the ineffectiveness of the government. The existence of the independent Armenian state is an 
important factor in making the experience of the unresolved Karabakh conflict different from 
the genocide: in stark contrast to the genocide, where the Armenian community could campaign 
for genocide recognition as a clear goal while state capabilities were limited, the interviewees 
no longer saw themselves or community initiatives as capable of securing the status of 
Karabakh. As Seda from the UK noted, 
You feel that you have so much love you want to give but physically you think well 
ZKDWFDQ,GR"/LNH6HGDFDQQRWVWRSKRVWLOH7XUNH\6HGDFDQQRWVWRSKRVWLOH$]HULV«
I definitely think that being this vulnerable small Christian nation surrounded by these 
big KRVWLOHSRZHUVWKDWLVDKDUGWKLQJIRUWKHGLDVSRUD$QGLW¶VGLIILFXOWEHFDXVHGRZH
KDYHWKHULJKWWRKDYHWKHVHYLHZVZKHQZHRXUVHOYHVDUHQ¶WWKHUH"6HGD20, UK) 
For Seda, the diaspora community is both disempowered and unable to suggest effective 
solutions to the conflict from a distance. Similarly, Rafael from France sees a limited role for 
the diaspora in resolving the status of Karabakh, suggesting that community resources would 
be spent more effectively on campaigning for genocide recognition: 
In the diaspora we talk more about the fight for genocide [recognition] rather than for 
Karabakh, because Karabakh, at the moment, is under Armenian control. For the state 
OHDGHUVLW¶VMXVWDQRWKHUSUREOHP:HFDQRQO\ZDLWIRU$]HUEDLMDQWRUHFRJQLVHWKis. 
But with the genocide, there are always things we [in the diaspora] can do. (Rafael, 24, 
France) 
For both Seda and Rafael, as for many other participants, resolving the Karabakh conflict was 
seen as the responsibility of the state and as a political problem, with little room for Armenian 
GLDVSRUD LQLWLDWLYHV 7KH VWDWH KRZHYHU ZDV PRVWO\ FULWLFL]HG IRU QRW SULRULWL]LQJ SHRSOH¶V
security in conflict negotiations and for not being hardline or decisive enough. Moreover, 
interviewees often approached Karabakh as part of a set of problems facing the Armenian 
government (such as corruption), and their critical or oppositional attitudes to state policies 
contributed to a certain sense of political disunity with the homeland (see Authors, 
forthcoming): 
The couQWU\¶VUHVRXUFHVDUHPRVWO\RULHQWHGWRZDUGVHQULFKLQJWKHSROLWLFLDQVDQGWKLV
is the problem. The four-day war [in Karabakh] revealed big problems with military 
HTXLSPHQWVRKHUHLQ)UDQFHZHOHGDSSHDOVWRKHOS$UPHQLDQVROGLHUV«WKH\GRQ¶W
have raincRDWVVOHHSLQJEDJVGURQHVRWKHUWKLQJV«$QGZHNQRZYHU\ZHOOWKDWWKH
oligarchy [in Armenia] KDVWKHPRQH\PLOOLRQVIRUWKDW7KDW¶VSDUDGR[LFDO7KH\KDYH
this post-soviet mentality ± make money, make money at the expense of others, while 
here in the diaspora we have a better vision of the Armenian nation. (René, 33, France) 
This vision, according to René, was not shared by state Armenians: while the diaspora was 
investing in the Armenian state and joining the struggle to restore their homeland, the locals 
were thinking of leaving. This makes René feel conflicted, as diasporic community 
mobilization in the face of the escalation appeared to be at odds with the (in)action and 
priorities of the state. The Karabakh conflict thus serves as an element of AUPHQLD¶VSUHVHQW
that provides a mobilizing patriotic focal point for the diasporic community, and at the same 
time surfaces disillusionment with the state. 
To conclude, the Karabakh conflict, although less commonly acknowledged by our 
interviewees as crucial to their sense of Armenian identity, closely interacts with memories of 
the genocide and contributes to their vision of homeland and mobilization as a community. Not 
least, Armenian control of Karabakh following the war is made important by the genocide, as 
a symbolic victory, a part of the homeland which has been won back. As an unresolved conflict, 
its memories and recent escalations contribute to narratives of survival. And yet, it also 
strengthens a sense of political disunity between the diaspora and the state, uncertainty about 
what should be done and a feeling of community disempowerment, thus making it less 
unequivocal as a mobilizing historical referent of Armenian diasporic identity. 
 
Genocide, Karabakh and everyday past presencing 
Besides the openly acknowledged influence of the past on the sense of collective identity and 
the relationship with the Armenian state, memories of the genocide and the Karabakh war had 
DPRUHXQFRQVFLRXVLQIOXHQFHHPEHGGHGLQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶HYHU\GD\self-understandings 
and behaviors. The self/other categories contained in these memories were projected onto 
friendships, social networks, families, and overall integration in British, French, or Russian 
societies. Many of our participants, including some second and third generation migrants, 
admitted that many or most of their friends were also Armenian, and for some, assimilation 
into the host society meant the loss of Armenian culture, a symbolic failure to survive, to 
preserve the Armenian identity. In this sense, unresolved histories both united diasporic 
community members from within, and contributed to the continuous and everyday 
reaffirmation of identity boundaries by excluding others: 
Here in France, when you work somewhere, and you meet a colleague who is Armenian 
you will have a particular relationship with him compared to your other colleagues. And 
ZKHQDQ,WDOLDQPHHWVDQRWKHU,WDOLDQLW¶VQRWWKHVDPHDK"%HFDXVH\RXNQRZ\RXDUH
a people who were born on a mountain of dead people, and we know the importance of 
this, we have to achieve. It is very linked to Karabakh because, I think if the genocide 
GLGQ¶WKDSSHQ$UPHQLDQVZRXOGQRWEHLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHVLWXDWLRQRI.DUDEDNK6RXUHQ
20, France) 
The experience of loss draws young diasporic Armenians apart from their non-Armenian peers 
at a personal, and not only collective level. Vazgen, born in the UK to an Armenian family who 
had fled the genocide to Syria and then moved to the UK in the late 1970s, comments: 
I remember as a child in school [in the UK], you were always asked to talk about family 
trees, to talk about where you are from, your history, and I was never able to really 
SDUWDNH LQ WKDW« ,W XSVHWV PH EHFDXVH WKHUH¶V VR PXFK ,¶G OLNH WR NQRZ DERXW P\
KLVWRU\DQG,FDQ¶W,¶OOQHYHUKDYHWKDWFKDQFHWRILQGRXW9D]JHQ33, UK)  
Souren, Vazgen and other participants noted the strong influence of the past on their behavior 
in the present, giving a new meaning ± symbolic survival ± to maintaining cultural, linguistic, 
or historical links with other Armenians. They vividly conjured the mass killing of the genocide 
as a factor in everyday interactions. Notions of survival, extermination, war, and killing 
emerged in how the participants spoke about their everyday lives, beyond remembering the 
genocide and the Karabakh war as historical events. For thePWKHVHZHUH³KLVWRULHVWKDWKDYH
VWD\HG RSHQ´ $KPHG   WKDW still influence individual behaviors and, not least, are 
experienced as the GLDVSRUD¶V expectation that new generations would µJXDUG¶ $UPHQLDQ
identity and ensure its survival. For example, Marina from the UK spoke of feeling social and 
family pressure to preserve Armenian identity and cultural heritage through marriage: 
Armenians are always like, why don't you marry a nice Armenian, you have to marry 
an Armenian boy because we're dying out, they are trying to kill us and it is like, Jesus 
Christ, it is 2017, you know, but people do genuinely believe that, a lot of people do, 
some of my family believe that because, you know, it is this constant struggle, this 
constant mentality of survival. (Marina, 25, UK) 
7KH LGHDRIZRPHQDV³NHHSHUVRI WKHFXOWXUH´ %LOOVRQ VXJJHVWVDQH[SHFWDWLRQ WKDW
identity, memory and culture are preserved within the family. Marina, however, sees this as an 
RXWGDWHGYLHZSRLQWIHHOLQJWKDWQHZJHQHUDWLRQVVKRXOG³PRYHRQ´IURP this preoccupation 
with loss. But besides family, the memories of the genocide and the Karabakh war also 
influenced friendship circles, particularly for those whose families had emigrated because of 
the war. For example, almost none of the young interviewees in Russia had Turkish or 
$]HUEDLMDQLIULHQGVDQGWKHUHVHHPHGWREHSHHUSUHVVXUHQRWWREHIULHQGVZLWKWKH³HQHP\´ 
When I became friends with other Armenians, we do not like Azeris... Now at university 
I know an Armenian student who is friends with a student from Azerbaijan, and for me 
WKDW¶VDELWRIDVKRFNEHFDXVH ,KDYHQ¶WEHHQIULHQGV>ZLWK$]HULV@«0DULDP 27, 
Russia) 
For another participant, the influence on friendships was even more extensive and affected 
people from other ethnic backgrounds too, depending on their attitude or involvement in the 
war: 
I try to mix with Russian guys more, even try to avoid people from the Caucasus as 
some of them fought for Azerbaijan in the war (Arsen, 28, Russia) 
It is worth noting the difference between the Russian and the French/British contexts here. 
Many of the French or British interviewees would not regularly encounter an Azeri, whereas 
in Moscow it would be normal for Armenians and Azeris, as Caucasians with similar migration 
patterns, to come across each other. Among older generations, there have been cases of good 
relations between the two communities in Moscow, including joint businesses. While avoiding 
Azeris in Moscow may be conscious post-war generation behavior among the diaspora youth 
(some of whose families left Armenia in the wake of the 1990s Karabakh war), there was little 
HYLGHQFHLQWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶UHVSRQVHs in France and the UK to suggest active avoidance of 
Turks in social encounters in the West ± rather, more general attitudes towards the nation. 
Interviews with young diasporic Armenians therefore reveal evidence of past presencing. The 
meaning and memories of the Karabakh war are overshadowed by the memories and 
consequences of the genocide, but ERWK WKHVH HYHQWV LQIOXHQFH WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ HYHU\GD\
behaviors beyond mere remembering. Such implicit past presencing, worked into friendships, 
family expectations, sense of purpose, and perception of subsequent events, is often at odds 
with the explicit, if cautious, desire to leave the traumatic past behind and redefine diasporic 
identity. This contradiction is further exposed in looking at the mediums through which this 
past is transmitted, relived and renegotiated, to which we now turn.  
 
Postmemory and new ways of relating to past and present 
For our participants, both the genocide and the Karabakh war of the 1990s are events which 
they did not witness directly. Growing up after or at the time when Armenia gained 
independence, their understanding of these events largely depends on trans-generational 
transmission, or the passing on of memories and myths through family, community, and 
cultural mediums, and the formation of postmemory (Hirsch 2012). Even the recent escalations 
of the Karabakh conflict were witnessed by the diaspora youth at a distance, although some 
remain more connected to the region than others. Nevertheless, the Karabakh war and the 
genocide played significant, though different roles in how diaspora youth described their 
identity, related to the distant homeland, and experienced the present. Importantly, they 
described several avenues of how these postmemories became important for their sense of 
identity.   
The transmission of colOHFWLYHPHPRULHVDPRQJ$UPHQLDQVLVW\SLFDOO\OLQNHGWRWKHµUHWHOOLQJ
RIJHQRFLGH¶IURPJHQHUDWLRQWRJHQHUDWLRQLQWKHIDPLO\=LHPHULQFOXGLQJWKHUHWHOOLQJ
RI SHUVRQDO IDPLO\ KLVWRULHV )RU PDQ\ GLDVSRUD $UPHQLDQV WKHLU IDPLOLHV¶ HPLJUDWLRQ LV 
directly connected to the events of 1915 or to the 1990s Karabakh war7. The genocide or the 
Karabakh war are often the reason for their being there, outside of the homeland in the first 
place, making the memory of these events foundational to the notions of identity and ³KRPH´
(Brah 1996). Reflecting back on their own childhood, our interviewees often spoke about 
learning about the genocide and the Karabakh war from immediate family. However, and 
particularly with Karabakh, there were occasions when older generations never spoke to them 
directly about these traumatic events. When transmission did happen, some of it was 
unintentional (overhearing parents talking about the war) or without yet realizing the full 
meaning of it: 
When I was small, perhaps 4-5 years old, my dad says he took me to a protest. I sat on 
KLVVKRXOGHUVDQGFULHG³.DUDEDNK>SKUDVHLQ$UPHQLDQ@´ZKLFKPHDQV.DUDEDNKLV
ours, Karabakh is Armenian. (Adrien, 32, France) 
But while trans-generational transmission within the family is clearly very important, we also 
observed additional ways in which young Armenians engaged with WKHLUKRPHODQG¶VSDVWDQG
present not available to previous generations: through Armenian societies and diaspora groups, 
through visits to Armenia (organised by schools, diaspora organizations and sponsors), and 
through social media.  
University was often the time when interviewees became more independent from their families, 
and the place where they became involved with Armenian societies and groups. Some spoke 
of (re)discovering Armenian history and identity, often beyond the attachments and memories 
shared within the family. As Vigen from Russia recounts, 
My study at Moscow State [University] was the first time I encountered a normal, 
organised Armenian society. I saw all their announcements, and I started thinking that, 
,GRQ¶WNQRZ,ZDQWHGWR«EHRIKHOSWRWKH>$UPHQLDQ@FRPPXQLW\RQWKHZKROHDQG
I still feel that way. (Vigen, 28, Russia) 
Often coinciding with their time at high school or University, a surprising number of our 
interviewees in all three countries visited Armenia through various programmes run by 
diaspora organizations, NGOs and the Armenian Ministry of Diaspora, who sponsored student 
exchanges and offered volunteer opportunities. Homeland tourism has been successfully 
employed by multiple homeland governments and diaspora structures in order to cultivate 
diasporic attachments (Abramson 2017). In the Armenian case, the post-independence period 
has seen the emergence of a variant of this phenomenon entailing assistance and exchange 
programmes with the local population run independently of the state (Darieva 2018).  For most 
our interviewees, even if they had been to Armenia with their family before the sponsored visit, 
this type of visit was a new experience, which enabled a different kind of an identity connection 
to be established: 
Every year we would visit my grandma and grandad in Armenia, and when I reached 
adulthood, having finished university, I travelled to Armenia for the first time not to 
visit relatives but through an American programme called YSIP8. That was an 
unforgettable experience. It was my discovery of Armenia, the other side of it. We 
worked there; we helped the local population for free; we travelled around Armenia and 
HYHQZHQWWR.DUDEDNK7KHUHZHUHJX\VIURPWKHGLDVSRUDLQ6\ULD86$&DQDGD«,
learnt a lot about Armenians in the West, they are very different from us«WKH\EHWWHU
know our history, even are more patriotic than Russian Armenians. (Mariam, 27, 
Russia) 
While the sponsored visit enabled Mariam to connect with Armenia and other Armenians 
abroad in a more significant way, another interviewee described how the postmemories of the 
genocide and the practices of commemoration, previously transmitted to him in his family and 
the diaspora community in France, came alive and gained new personal significance on his first 
visit to Yerevan: 
Until the age of 15 I had neYHUEHHQWR$UPHQLD«DQGWKHQP\VFKRRORUJDQLVHGDYLVLW
This was April 24, the commemorations of the 95h anniversary of the genocide in 
<HUHYDQ«ZKHQ,FDPHRXWRIWKHDLUSRUWWKHUH,IHOWVKLYHUVUXQQLQJDOOWKURXJKP\
ERG\%HFDXVH ,VDLGWRP\VHOI³VR,¶PWKHUH ,¶PLQP\FRXQWU\RQWKHODQGRIP\
DQFHVWRUV´,PHDQLIZHKDGIRXJKWIRUVRPDQ\\HDUVWKLVLQIDFWZDVWKHIUXLWRIRXU
EDWWOHRIRXUZDU,PHDQ«7DNLQJSDUWLQWKHFRPPHPRUDWLRQVWKHUH«ZDVVRGLIIHUHQW
from France, in France there are protests, loud cries; in Armenia everyone was in black 
and weeping. At that moment I felt part of the Armenian community. (Magar, 28, 
France) 
The experiences of Mariam and Magar, also typical of other participants, demonstrate that 
reconnection of young diaspora Armenians with their homeland and transmission of collective 
memories also happen outside of the traditional confines of family and local diaspora 
community. These additional avenues for UHPHPEHULQJDQGUHODWLQJWRWKHKRPHODQG¶VSDVW and 
present offered powerful new perceptions of identity as they linked the postmemories of 
genocide, war, and loss to places and communities that the young people could witness in 
person and in the present. Sponsored homeland visits and the coming of age that often 
coincided with a revived interest in the homeland show how the new generations begin to write 
their own identity stories independently from their families, yet how postmemories are relived 
in them. 
Social media provide further opportunities for the young generation to develop and become 
active agents in their identity stories, interweaving the genocide and Karabakh into their self-
understandings or on the contrary, moving away from the established interpretations of events 
in the homeland. The connection of diasporic youth to events in the homeland and to each other 
is becoming increasingly digital, facilitated by news websites and social media. During the 
escalation of the Karabakh conflict in April 2016, many participants were kept informed 
through social media posts, including some who were not actively seeking information, but 
were simply subscribed to an Armenian group on Facebook: 
All the Armenian diaspora have already liked an Armenian page, and on all of these 
pages you have articles, and the constant, not propaganda, but the constant news that 
ZDVFRPLQJWKURXJK,PHDQLW¶VKDUGWRLJQRUH (Anahid, 21, France) 
Social media brought geographically distant events close, while the plurivocal and interactive 
nature of online discussions facilitated both mobilization and contestation in relation to the 
KRPHODQG¶VSDVWDQGSUHVHQW.  
For some, social media can become a space for activism, for online battles to affirm social and 
historical justice from a distance.  In such cases, awareness of the plurality of perspectives on 
the conflict reported online was seen to motivate a desire to join in promoting a particular 
position on the virtual battlefield over postmemory. For example, Moscow participant Arsen 
(28) recounts taking part in online truth wars surrounding the Karabakh conflict through ³an 
analytical group on a social network where I fight against the distortion of facts´. While the 
group provides Arsen with an opportunity to engage, his experience online also leaves him 
feeling frustrated with the Armenian community, as he later complains that many Armenians 
online are indifferent because they live outside of Armenia and distance themselves from its 
problems. In this way, digital platforms can empower youth in diaspora to take an active role 
in present-day causes linked to transmitted memories but can also bring out differences or 
tensions within the community.  
The proximity and immediacy of events brought by social media can also contain the reassuring 
promise of transparency in the conflict. René from France, for example, felt that the instant 
nature of contemporary media communications meant that they functioned as a means of global 
accountability and a deterrent against new large-scale violence against the Armenian 
community: 
Today, in the era of communication and information, nothing can happen anymore 
without people being aware of it. And I think today, at least in Armenia, there can no 
longer be a hidden war or a massacre that is concealed. (René, 33, France) 
From this perspective, the daily witnessed reality of low intensity suffering represented by the 
Karabakh conflict is juxtaposed with the unaccounted-for mass crime of the genocide, firmly 
located in the past. Social media here is understood to create a new role for diaspora Armenians 
as ever-present witnesses to potential violence and keepers of the nation and its past through 
their online presence.   
On the other hand, social media has provided young diasporic Armenians with a space to 
contest, if not move away from, certain interpretations of the past and present. For example, 
Marina from the UK describes feeling disgusted by the mass nationalism of other Armenians 
on social media during the April 2016 escalation in Karabakh: 
$UPHQLDQVDUHH[WUHPHO\DFWLYHRQ)DFHERRN«:KLOH,¶PGHYDVWDWHGWKDWWKRVHSRRU
guys got killed in this war, living outside of Armenia in a country where there has been 
SHDFH,¶m extremely, you know, anti-nationalist«:KHQWKH$SULOVWXIIKDSSHQHGODVW
\HDU,ZDVUHDOO\FRQIOLFWHGEHFDXVHHYHU\RQHDURXQGPHZDV\RXNQRZµZHORYHRXU
WURRSV¶ µ*RGEOHVV VROGLHUV¶ µ*RGEOHVV WKHDUP\¶DQGVWXII«SHRSOHZHUHSRVWLQJ
links like, you know, we killed this many [enemies] in this conflict, and people were 
OLNHµ\D\¶7KDWZDVKRUULEOH0DULQD25, UK) 
 $OWKRXJKQRWDOOSDUWLFLSDQWVVKDUHG0DULQD¶VDWWLWXGHWRHVFDODWLRQVLQ.DUDEDNKWhe majority 
of young people interviewed voiced explicit concerns about bias and unreliability of news they 
accessed about events in the region. $V5DIDHOIURP)UDQFHSXW LW µ,W¶V UHDOO\DVKDPH
EHFDXVH LW¶V YHU\ KDUG WR KDYH UHOLDEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ >WKH .DUDEDNK FRQIOLFW@´ Several 
participants made an active effort to seek out varied online sources or cross-check news in 
order to be better informed.  
The desire to gain a balanced assessment of events often overshadowed any personal emotions 
concerning the significance of the territory to the Armenian community among those without 
close personal ties to Karabakh. Awareness of different perspectives on the conflict 
encountered online left some participants hesitant to voice a clear position. This ambivalent 
approach to the conflict based on experience of it primarily as a media phenomenon was seen 
by some a generationally distinct aspect of diaspora identity, particularly among the young 
Armenians in the UK and France: 
I'm very conscious of the fact that I'm only getting one side of the story, because when 
I read a lot of Azeri news and a lot of stuff is complete propaganda and fake, it makes 
me think, like, ok, hang on, how much of what I am reading about from Armenian news 
is real, you know? And it is hard to explain to my parents because they lived through 
and they saw so many friends of theirs die in the war in the 90s. So, with this, yes, it is 
UHDOO\ VDGDQG UHDOO\GLIILFXOW WRJHW \RXUKHDGDURXQGDV VRPHRQHZKRGRHVQ¶W OLYH
there. (Marina, 25, UK) 
 Thus, while homeland visits have helped many of our participants revive postmemories and 
experience the significance of the past in new ways, digital media has led diasporic youth to 
engage with the Karabakh conflict and other events in their homeland in more ambivalent ways. 
On the one hand, digital media make distant events present and empower diasporas as online 
witnesses of potential (in)justice. On the other ± the new generation can come to question 
uncritical, nationalist or one-sided accounts of events, the actions of the Armenian state, and 
the $UPHQLDQFRPPXQLW\¶VDFFHSWDQFHDQGUHSURGXFWLRQRIQDUUDWLYHVDERXWLWVWUDXPDWLFSDVW
The latter has potential to disrupt the long-term viability of these narratives as shared referents 
of diasporic identity in the future. 
  
Conclusion 
This article has explored some of the dilemmas experienced and voiced by Armenian diasporic 
youth in negotiating their identity in relation to the genocide and the Karabakh war. ³0RYLQJ
RQ´IURPFROOHFWLYHPHPRULHVRIWKHJHQRFLGe as shaping Armenian diasporic identity was a 
recurring theme in interviews in all three locations. Interview participants spoke of moving on 
as redefining themselves and the diasporic community beyond narratives of victimhood and 
loss, passing on identity without passing on the pain to the next generations, being active agents 
in writing their own identity story, and questioning some of the less critical accounts of the 
KRPHODQG¶VSDVWDQGSUHVHQWThis finding challenges the vision of past traumas as foundational 
and defining identity narratives that are continuously shared and agreed on by the new diasporic 
generations. <HWPRYLQJRQGLGQRWPHDQDFOHDUEUHDNZLWKWKHSDVWLQIDFW\RXQJSHRSOH¶V
cautious desire to move on and redefine Armenian identity beyond traumatic history was at the 
same time evidence of how strongly they experienced past presencing. It was clear that they 
were acutely aware of and deeply involved in the reproduction of a past which they had not 
directly witnessed. The legacy of the genocide and the more recent unresolved Karabakh 
conflict was experienced, represented, and performed ± in other words, made present beyond 
simply remembering. The Karabakh conflict, as a symbolic fight to protect part of the 
homeland, was LQWHUSUHWHGLQOLJKWRIWKHJHQRFLGHDQGWKH³PHQWDOLW\RIVXUYLYDO´SHUPHDWHG
everyday behaviours, from friendships to visions of family, homeland, and the future.  
There is also ambivalence about the role of the Karabakh war in Armenian diasporic identity, 
in the presence of an independent Armenian state. The Karabakh conflict, as a more recent 
event and part of the struggle for an independent homeland, contributes to diaspora 
mobilization, but is also interpreted from a distancing, pragmatic perspective as a problem that 
Armenians abroad cannot help resolve. The presence of the state makes the experience of the 
Karabakh conflict different from the genocide and less unifying, both in terms of responsibility 
for the status quo and action that needs to be taken.  
The dilemma of prioritising the memories RIWKHJHQRFLGHDQG.DUDEDNKRUµPRYLQJRQ¶WR
interpretations of diasporic identity beyond the core narratives of victimhood is deepened by 
the diverse and increasingly digital practices of relating to events in the homeland in which 
young people in diaspora can now engage. Whether expressing a cautious desire to write their 
own identity story on top of the inherited postmemory of the genocide or distancing themselves 
from attitudes to the Karabakh conflict found online, they took the past along with them in 
FRQFHSWLRQVRIKRPHODQGDQGLGHQWLW\ZKLOHDOVRTXHVWLRQLQJZKHWKHUWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VIXWXUH
should be only about this past. The example of Armenian diasporic youth demonstrates how 
digital media can help new generations of this and other diasporas mobilize in new ways in 
response to critical events in the homeland but also stimulate reflection on these events, critical 
engagement with news sources, and ambivalence over narratives of homeland and diaspora 
identity. Importantly, this case VKRZVKRZ\RXQJJHQHUDWLRQVKDYHDOUHDG\EHJXQWRµPRYHRQ¶
by reproducing foundational narratives but at the same time questioning and problematizing 
them. 
  
1
 Homeland has been a contested notion for Armenians: the borders of the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia do 
not include the lands from where most of the genocide survivors fled, and even before the genocide there had 
EHHQ³QRFOHDUO\GHILQHGFHQWHUDQGSHULSKHU\DFNQRZOHGJHGE\DOO$UPHQLDQV´3DWWLH+RZHYHUWKH
survival of the independent Armenian state today is widely acknowledged by diaspora Armenians as highly 
important (Avdoyan 1998), denoting its mobilizing potential as homeland.  
2
 The Armenian genocide involved systematic extermination and deportation of Armenians by the Ottoman 
empire from April 1915 and throughout World War I. It left approximately 1.5 million people dead and caused 
many to flee (Alayarian 2008). Most Armenian diasporas around the world appeared as the result of the 
genocide. 
3
 Nagorno-Karabakh is a territory disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan as both claim to have historical rights on 
it. Violent conflict erupted in the final years of the Soviet Union between Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, 
backed by the Republic of Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with the most intensive fighting in 1993-1994. The war 
ended in a ceasefire, but the sides failed to negotiate a peace treaty. The conflict remains unresolved, with a 
number of major escalations in recent years. Currently Karabakh is a self-proclaimed independent state, de facto 
under Armenian control and protection. 
4
 The ³new generation´ in this study has two meanings, which contribute to one another, but do not always 
overlap: 1) generation that marks distance from past events (genocide, migration) and interprets them through 
postmemory, and 2) generation as the cohort of young people who have grown up in the particular context of the 
independent Armenian state, the Karabakh conflict and digital media.  
5
 Most recently, the genocide was recognized by the German parliament in 2016, escalating tensions with 
Turkey. 
6
 A similar criticism of host society media by diaspora youth has also been observed by Eide et al (2014) in the 
case of Pakistani, Afghan and Tamil diasporas in Norway; and likewise, Armenian diaspora youth have 
increasingly turned to online and social media to keep in touch with events back at home, as we discuss later in 
the paper. 
7
 In our pool of participants, most Armenian youth in the United Kingdom and France traced their familLHV¶ 
emigration back to the genocide, while families of the Armenian interviewees in Russia mostly left Armenia in 
the wake of the 1990s Karabakh war. This agrees with the overall view in the diaspora studies of Armenian 
diasporas in Europe as ³older´ diasporas, while the diaspora in Russia is post-Soviet, not least because Armenia 
was part of the USSR for most of the time between the genocide and the Karabakh war. 
8
 YSIP (Yerevan Summer Internship Program) is a project run by the Armenian General Benevolent Union 
(AGBU), which offers university students aged 19-26 an opportunity to gain work experience LQ$UPHQLD¶V
capital. 
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